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Context
3
The Role of 
Cybersecurity Frameworks & Control Sets
Pillars of a Cybersecurity program
Governance Roles, Processes, Policies
Resources People, Infrastructure, and Security Tools… Money
Controls Procedural, technical, administrative safeguards/countermeasures
Bottom Line:
Competent security programs require adopting some 
resources and tools to support program 
development, maintenance, and optimization.
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What to select?  Why to select?
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Effective.  
Inclusive.  Evidence-based.  Adaptable.
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Efficient.  
Doable.  Affordable.  Prioritized.  Time-saving.
This community requires both.
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Problems
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Is risk management really a good fit for 
cybersecurity?
1. Risk management processes found in the existing 
frameworks (NIST RMF; NIST CSF) make questionable 
assumptions:
a. Cybersecurity presents a measurable environment with some 
historical stability (e.g., actuarial history). 
b. Organizations have the time, money, and expertise to execute 
intensive procedural regimes. 
2. As a result:
a. Much time and money has been wasted on quasi-quantitative risk 
assessments with little or no validity...
b. Rather than getting the basic processes and protections in place 
frameworks like NIST RMF give lip service to risk management, but 
devolve into massive documentation games and checklist 
maintenance.
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NIST RMF has been looming...
NIST RMF was created in response to the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA), to create information security standards 
for the federal government. FISMA set out the basic process, and NIST was 
tasked with fleshing out the details. The detailed approach created by NIST 
is generalized as the Risk Management Framework (RMF).
In last year’s plenary session, the United States Antarctic Program’s Tim 
Howard appeared to make the case that NIST RMF and SP 800-53 are 
obvious sources of procedural and control selection guidance for the NSF 
science community. 
Yet, Anurag Shankar and Susan Ramsey told a harrowing story of RMF in 
application. 
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NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)
Efficient?... Heck no!
1. Assumes you have a lot of time, money, and expertise to devote to 
cybersecurity compliance.  (And, we can’t clone Anurag.)
2. Massive control list and incredible amounts of documentation.
3. Not prioritized.  Kitchen sink approach.  Regardless of assessed risk 
level, you will have a LOT of controls to implement that are all treated 
equally.
4. Costly to interpret into system engineering requirements.  Hundreds of 
pages of controls can turn into thousands of pages of requirements.
5. Distracts from mission and security. 
The SANS 2016 IT Security Spending Trends Survey reported regulatory compliance as 
a much more significant driver for spending than, e.g., reducing attack surface, 
improving visibility (detection), new, advanced threats and techniques, and improving 
incident response.  It is possible to have a lightweight compliance regime, but that is 
NOT what we have in with NIST RMF.
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NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF)
Effective?... It’s costly, but does it get us security?
Facial Problems w/ RMF and 800-53:
1. Vagueness.  Written in abstractions that are difficult to test for adherence. 
2. Arbitrariness.  Little or no evidence that control set (800-53) is based on evidence of what 
works.
3. Insufficiency. Compliance does not produce a state of security.  Practitioners will tell you 
there are always gaps to fill.
4. Near-sighted.  System focused (versus mission focused)
5. Assuming.  Promotes quantitative or semi-quantitative risk assessments that take a ton of 
time and are usually based on guess-work.
As-Applied Problems:
6. Too difficult to do right.  There is a right way, but almost nobody does it the right way. 
7. Not true risk management.  “Compensating controls” has a bad connotation; auditors don’t 
want to see innovations.  
○ Kristen Baldwin, Acting DASD(SE), has presented on this topic as it impacts her work as 
DoD’s lead for systems engineering
8. Growing evidence that it is *not* getting good results.
○ See last two FISMA reports to Congress. “Federal agencies were not immune … in 
2016, with over 30,899 cyber incidents that led to the compromise of information or 
system functionality.” 
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NIST SP 800-171. (For more, see blog.trustedci.org/)
NIST SP 800-171 was created in response to Executive 
Order 13556 “Controlled Unclassified Information.”
What does it do?
● Standardizes how the federal government treats 
unclassified information that is still subject to some 
infosec requirements.
● It is a guidance document to help implement the 
executive order.
● It does not apply directly to non-federal entities (i.e. 
us), but may be incorporated into contracts, 
cooperative agreements, or grants.
13
NIST SP 800-171  
Effective? . . . It depends.
1. SP 800-171 wasn’t designed to be a comprehensive 
control set.
2. It is an attempt to standardize federal regulations for 
unclassified information. (E.g. privacy laws)
3. Mostly focused on confidentiality.  We know that 
availability and integrity are as much or more 
important to this community’s mission.
4. Still a compliance regime.
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NIST SP 800-171
Efficient?... Seems unlikely
1. SP 800-171 is less burdensome than full-blown RMF, 
but in return you are getting even less security.
2. AND it is still likely to entail a lot of procedural 
overhead, meaning $$$$
3. Not to mention, you will still need more security on 
top of SP 800-171.
4. This is, however, more efficient than the 
unconsolidated regulations we previously had.
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NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
Developed in response to Executive Order 13636, the “NIST Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” released in 2014. Draft 
version 1.1 is in progress.
More recently, Executive Order 13800 suggested using CSF for federal 
systems, with uncertain long-term ramifications.
Why is this important:
● Represents a partnership between the private sector and federal govt.
● Picking up steam, US led, international buy-in,
○ E.g., in August 2014, Dr. Phyllis Schneck (DHS) gave a pitch for the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework at this event.
● Standardization 
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NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
Effective?... Hard to say.
1. Voluntary. CSF requires nothing.
Corporate lawyers love this.
2. Broad. The control set is: 
a. Primarily pointing to other resources (includes CSC, 800-53). 
b. Not prioritized. 
c. Not as balanced toward resilience (detection, response, recovery) 
as first appears
3. Vague. “Tiers” are difficult to operationalize into 
actual measurement. 
4. Similar problems with RMF relating to “risk 
management” and assessments.
5. Bottom line: Depends a LOT on how you use it.
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NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)
Efficient?... Again, hard to say. 
1. Potentially efficient in that it requires nothing. Call it “highly 
flexible.”
2. Related resources (e.g., DHS Cyber Resilience Review) appear 
to have little if any relationship to the original document.
3. Have to be prepared to build an approach to using it.
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Alternatives
Governance: 
What does sound, sane cyber risk management entail?
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Sound, sane cyber risk management
1. Roles: Senior leadership and/or asset owners are the 
appropriate residual risk acceptors
2. Communication: Security personnel are the SMEs 
who help risk acceptors make informed decisions 
and deal with the daily care-and-feeding.
3. Decision-making: Make tradeoffs and accept risk!
4. Policy:  You may not need a lot, but you have to have 
a little, and you have to be rigorous across the policy 
lifecycle. 
Develop - Adopt - Educate - Follow - Enforce - 
Revise (DAEFER)
… and, skip the expensive, invalid quasi-quantitative risk assessment.
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“If the highest aim of a captain were to 
preserve his ship, he would keep it in port 
forever.” 
- Thomas Aquinas
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If you want a framework...
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AFCEA’s The Economics of Cybersecurity
John Gilligan, fmr USAF CIO, now CIS
Background
1. Cyber has limited data for quantitative 
assessments.
2. Most cyber-attacks are unsophisticated.
3. Total protection is uneconomical.
Takeaways:
1. Focus on low-cost, high-impact 
interventions.
2. Prioritize defenses against common, 
unsophisticated attacks.
3. Utilize targeted defenses against 
high-sophistication, high-criticality 
attacks.
4. Accept risk of high-sophistication, 
low-criticality attacks.
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Controls: 
What control sets are effective and efficient?
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Center for Internet Security’s
Critical Security Controls (aka the Top 20)
Effective
1. Developed in a diverse, practitioner heavy 
environment.  E.g., NSA involved. (See, 
https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/history)
2. Updated frequently.
3. Testable and provable. (The plaintiffs bar and regulators will 
prefer this. So will technologists, engineers, and scientists.) 
4. Good enough for Kamala Harris! (See, 2016 California Data 
Breach Report. The CSC’s have the potential to become the de facto 
legal standard of “reasonable security” nationally.)
Efficient
5. Prioritized!!! (See, esp., Pescatore, Back to Basics: 
Focus on the First Six CIS Critical Security Controls)
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Australian Signals Directorate’s
Essential Eight (fka Top 4)
Effective
1. Based on systematic study of actual attacks and 
breaches!!
2. Controls selected are those that would have 
prevented the most breaches
Efficient
3. There are only 8!!! (or potentially 4)
4. Prioritized by how many breaches the control would 
have stopped
5. Clear implementation guidance
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ASD Essential 8 / CIS CSC-6.1 Cross Walk
Application Whitelisting
CSC 2.2: Inventory of authorized and unauthorized software: Application Whitelisting
Disable untrusted MS Office Macros (may be less important for science)
CSC 2.2: Inventory of authorized and unauthorized software: Application Whitelisting
Patch Applications
CSC 3.1: Secure configurations for hardware and software: Refresh/update application versions
CSC 4.5: Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation: Deploy automated patch management
CSC 18.1: Application software security: Install latest version and all relevant patches
User Application Hardening
CSC 3.1: Secure configurations for hardware and software: Install hardened version of applications
CSC 18.4: Application software security: Test applications for common security weaknesses
Restrict Admin Privileges
CSC 5.1: Controlled use of administrative privileges: Minimize administrative privileges 
Multifactor Authentication
CSC 5.6: Controlled use of administrative privileges: Use multi-factor authentication for admin acces
CSC 16.11: Account monitoring and control: Require multi-factor for access to sensitive information
Patch Operating Systems
CSC 3.1: Secure configurations for hardware and software: Refresh/undate OS versions
CSC 4.5: Continuous vulnerability assessment and remediation: Deploy automated patch management
Daily Backup of Important Data
CSC 10.1: Data recovery capability: Frequent, automatic backup for systems with sensitive data
Orange = Original Top 4; Yellow = new additions 28
Your Summer Reading List
AFCEA: The Economics of Cybersecurity 
https://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/CyberEconfinal.pdf (8 pgs) 
CIS Critical Security Controls
Poster: https://www.sans.org/media/critical-security-controls/critical-controls-poster-2016.pdf (1 
pg)
Full document: https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-controls-download (requires registration) (96 pgs)
Back to Basics 
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/basics-focus-first-cis-critical-security-co
ntrols-37537 (5 pgs)
Australian Signals Directorate: Essential Eight 
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/protect/Essential_Eight_Explained.pdf (2 pgs)
https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Top_4_Strategies_Explained.pdf (top 4) (42 pgs)
California Data Breach Report, 2016  
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/dbr/2016-data-breach-report.pdf (focus on the 
Executive Summary and Recommendations)  (5 pgs)
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